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The European Union: single
market pressures
Dorte S.Martinsen and Paula Blomqvist
14.1 Introduction
Although health care policies arc formally the competence of the member states,
and although policy reforms within health care have historicallY for the most
been driven through domestic reforms, the internal market pri'nciples of the
EU increasingly impact and challenge the national organization of health care.
Particularly sillce the late 19905, the principles of the internal market have
reached within the formerly secluded area of national health polin'. !n add-
ition, the health care systems of the i\'ordic member states are in~rea~ingly
affected by the free movement logics orthe encapsulating polity. In incremental
and rather uncoordinated \vays, the :-<ordic member states ha\"e started to adapt;
meamvhile new challenges are emerging.
This chapter is structureci into four main sections. Section 14.2 discusses the
theoretical perspectives on EU social policy and their likel~" effect on national
policie~. Section 14.3 then analyses specific decisions of the activist European
Court of Justice (ECJ) and how these have gradually formed the contours of
supranational health care regulation in terms of patient mobilitv. Section 14.4
sets out the characteristics of the ]'\;ordic health care model in a European
context in general and then Section 1..1-.5 focuses on the implementation or
adaptation carried out by the Swedish and Danish health care systems, with brief
comparisons to Finland and Norway. I
14.2 Theoretical perspectives on European social policy
The rapid progress of European integration in the area of social policy after the
1980s surprised many. Previously, it \vas generall~' believed that the welfare
states of western Europe. with their different historical trajectories, \\'ould never
i
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subject themselves to regulation from a supranational body or take to the idea of
convergence to\vards a common 'European' model. Today, direct regulation of
issues clearly within the realm of social policy arc not uncommon within the
EU, for instance in the areas of public health, work and safety and access to
health care. In addition, far-reaching efforts have been undertaken on a volun-
tary basis by the member states to coordinate policies within core welfare areas
such as pensions, health services provision, poverty reduction and elderly care.
These developments, which were thought unlikely only a fel",'years ago, suggest
that national welfare states are not quite as 'immobile' as earlier believed (e.g.
Pierson 2001). They also raise the possibility of real convergence bet \veen them,
even though this might come about in a slov.' and uneven manner. Maurizio
Ferrera (200S) argues that we see today the emergence of a new type of social poli-
tics in Europe, characterized by a diminished importance of geographical hor-
ders and nationally confined arenas of policy-making. Increasingly, European
citizens can chose to which type of v\'elfare community (Le. a community
insuring them against social risk) they want to belong, as such communities
need no longer be defined by territorial borders. By the same token, policy-
making processes are mewing from the nation states towards the European
networks and decision~making bodies.
There are, however, many questions still to be answered about the dynamics
of integration in European social policy and its effects on policy-making pro-
cesses \vithin national welfare states. What are the main driving forces behind
integration in this policy area and how do integration efforts affect political
power balances at the domestic level? Who gains and who loses when the
locus of policy-making shifts towards the supranational lever? And what role
do domestic political institutions play in shaping final policy outcomes as EU
regulations and initiatives are implemented at the member state level?
One of the driving forces behind integration in the social policy fIeld in recent
years is undoubtedly what might be called spill-over effects from the creation of
the single European market in the early 1990s. As the market came into force,
observers pointed to its potential threat to the social protection systems of
the member states and demanded that it be amended by measures to safeguard
the systems. As a result, the project 'Social Europe' was born; a discursive plat~
form where pro~\\'elfare forces including politicians both to the left and right,
EU civil servants, unions, lObby groups and policy experts could gather to
formulate an agenda oriented tmvards protecting existing welfare systems in
the region and to identify common goals for these. Such efforts were, hovvever,
hampered by the fact that the member states remained unv\'illing to delegate
authority to the EU in the area of social policy. For this reason, the goals formu-
lated under the banner of Social Europe remained vague and non-committal
and few concrete measures '",'ere taken to create social regulation that could
balance the pro-market orientation of the FU Treaty. Exceptions include work
and safety standards in the labour market, \'I'hich have been regulated through
a string of binding directives during the 1980s and 1990s, and precautions
taken in the wake of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease)
outbreak to ensure the safe transport of blood and donor organs (Blomqvist
2004).
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14.2.1 E"ropea" legalism as a drlvl"g force
In the late 1990s, social policy formation within the EU entered a new phasl:
The activities of the ECj drew more political attention as the court slarted It
deliver decisions that seemed to infringe on the autonomy of the member statc{
in this highly sensitive political area. This was true particularly in health car(-
but rulings with the same orientation were also handed down in other welfarl
areas such as social insurance. The most controversial aspect of the ruling.~
which typically went further than existing regulations in ensuring the right 0:
access to national welfare systems 9n the part of EU nationals from orller mem-
ber states, was that the ECj based its decisions not on the social regulatioll{
themselves but recent articles in the EU Treaty safeguarding the four freedolTl"
that underpinned the single market. The ECJ ar&'Ued that, in order to mo"t'
around freely in the region to seek \-york, all European citizens must have acces~
to national social security systems on the same conditions as the inhabitants
This meant, in effect, that long-standing principles of social rights as linked W
'latiOlIa/ citizenship and territorial borders were cast aside (Liebfried and Pierson
2000; Erhag 2004; Ferrera 200S). The reCl'ntly proposed Directive on Patient
Mobility from the European Commission has confirmed that the reasoning b~.
the EC) concerning the rights of EU nationals in the area of health will indeed
be part of a common European policy in this area.
The heightened activity of the EC) and its far-reaching implications for nation
sovereignty can be seen as a sign of the increased legalism within European
politics. According to scholars studying international organization, legalism
became generally more important as a means to go\'ern international relations
during the 1990s. Examples include the setting-up of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the "'vorld Trade Organization, international criminal trib.
unes, and \'arious quasi-legal agreements such as the United Nations' Kyoto
Protocol (Goldstein et al. ] 998). Among such phenomena, the EC) stands out.
hO\'\'ever, as the extreme case of creating 'hard' (e.g. binding) legal regulations in
order to govern a community of sovereign states. As observed by Garrett and
co-workers (1998, p. 149), 'the accretion of power by thc European Court of
Justice (ECj) is arguably the clearest manifestation of the transfer of sovereignty
from nation-states to a supranational institution, not only in the European
Union (EU) but also in modern international politics more generally'.
Interpretations of the increased legalism of EU integration and its implica-
tions for the member states vary. To some, the increasingly important role of
the EC) in driving the integration process forward signalled that the member
states had lost control over it and that they had failed to see, in setting up the
ECJ as a constitutional court and arming it with the Single European Act of
1986, what the consequenccs \-"ould be for their sovereignty. This so-called neo-
functionalist interpretation stresses, moreover, that the activities of the EC)
have undermined the role of the nation states as political actors in the region in
that its existence makes it possible for other social actors to appeal to it, thereby
shifting political battles from the national pOlitical arena, ,,,,ith its vested power
structurcs, to an arena outside the reach of national policy-makers (Alter 1998,
2000; Mattli and Slaughter 1998). In contrast, the intergovenmentalist perspec-
tive sees the ECJ more as an agent of the interests of the member states and
••••
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argues that the member states have been basically supportive of its integration
agenda. According to this view, the ECJ is not totally unrestrained by the
member states but has to manoeuvre strategically in relation to them in order to
preserve its political legitimacy (Garrett 1995; Garrett et al. 1998). Looking spe-
ciflcallv at the activities of the ECJ in the area of social policy and the predomin-
antly I~egative reactions of the member states to its rulings in this area so far, it
seems that the neo-functionalist interpretation would have the most empirical
support (e.g. Alter 2000; Liebfried and Pierson 2000; Mossialos and McKee 2002;
Geer 2006). Therefore, a general implication of the strengthened role of the ECj
in health and social policy would seem to be that the sovereignty of the member
states has been undermined in these areas, despite the fact that this is officially
guarded by exiting EU Treaties.
14.2.2. CoordlrlatilJK Europea" healtlr policies
Another important feature of contemporary European social policy is that a
growing share is formulated on the basis of voluntary agreements betwecn
the member states, reached within the framework of the so-called 'open
method of coordination' (O~vIC). The ONtC refers to a process whereby common
policy guidelines are formulated and translated into national policy objectives
through agreements between the Commission and the member state in ques-
tion. The subsequent process of implementing the objectives is driven forward
by periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, based on agreed-upon indi-
cators and benchmarks that compare the performance of the members or have
been identified as 'best practice' in a given pot icy area (Borras and Jacobsson
2004). The EC) rulings in the late 1990s and early 2000s rai<;c'(lconcerns over
a legal 'spill.o\'er effect' from the Single European Act to the area of health care;
a prospect that many member states have seen as undesirable. Thus, the activ-
ities of the ECj seem to have, to some extent, acted as a promptcr for the initi.
ation of an O~..•.IC process in health care in order to take back some political
initiative in this area (Geer 2006). The process has been actively supported
by the European Council and the Ministers of lIealth, who see a potential for
deepened cooperation among the member states in the area of health. The
Commission, too, has argued that the process is desirable in order to meet
common health challenges among the member states, such as ageing and med-
ical technology developments as well as the possibility of increased cross-border
patient mobility. It has also identified three basic objecth'es for the OMC process
in health care:~
• to insure access to health care for all within cach mcmber state, regardless of
income or social status
• to promote high quality of all health services provided in all of the region
• to ensure the financial sustainability of national health care systems.
The goals were endorsed by the member states during the meeting of the
European Council in Barcelona in 2002. In 2004, the Or-..fC process in the area of
health and long-term care was formally launched ..1 Since then, the Social
Protection Committee (SPC) has developed a list of indicators to monitor the
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performance of the health care systems of the member states in rebtion to the
common objectives. The member states have reported their performance in the
form of so-called National Strategic Reports on two occasions so far, 2006 and
2008. No common policy guidelines for the area of health care have been pre-
sented yet by the Commission, however. The OMC health is still in an early
phase. In addit'ion, many member states are still sceptical about formulating
common policies in this area.
Like the ECj ruling), the OMC can be seen as a means to bypass the regular
system of political decision-making within the EU, with its joint decision traps
and numerous veto points (Obinger et a1. 2005). The emerging research on the
OMC links the adoption of this new Ineans to coordinate interests between the
member states within the EU with a more general movement towards a Jess
hierarchical and more negotiation-based mode of governance. Therefore, the
adoption of the OMC process in the area of health care could also be seen as
reflecting the broader tendency to shift from traditional, hierarchical govern-
ing techniques to more network-based and informal modes of governance in
European politics (Rhodes 1997).
In 2008, the creation of a common European health policy took a further
decisive step, as the Commbsion presented a proposal for a directive on patient
mobility vvithin the EU. The proposal reflected a general desire by the members
to have more clarity of the rules in this area, given the apparent risk that the
rulings by the EC./ would be interpreted differently by different member states.
The directive proposal is tailored closely to the EC./ rulings and thus, in effect.
confirms the policies already established by the court {see below). Hence, it
seems a clear case of a legal spill-over effect \-vhereby closer political integration
in the area of health care has been propelled by activism on the part of judicial
bodies.
It seems safe to conclude that the EU will playa more important role a~
regulator and knowledge centre in the health care sector in the future; a deve].
opment which implies a movement towards increased policy coordination and
systems convergence in this area.
14.3 Judicial activism and health care integration
Until 1998, access to foreign health care providers in the EU was regulated solely
through the system coordinating social security rights for migrant workers
(i.e. Regulation 1408/71)."1 The member states, the Commission and the Ee.!
appeared to have found an interinstitutional consensus that European citizens
were entitled to immediate and lIecessary health care in other member states
as well as to other kinds of publicly financed health treatment, provided that
they had been (Jutlwrized beforehand by the competent national institution.
The European health card regulates the right to immediate and necessary
health care. Moreover, planned treatment in another member state is accessible
through a form, El12, where the competent national institution prior to treat-
ment has authorized the right to have it carried out in another member state.
This institutional status quo was seriously upset from 1998 onwards when the-
IC./ initiated a series of case-law decisions questioning the iustincation for 'prior
..1
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authorization' and through which the principles of the internal market have
gradually heen introduced into the health care policy field.; The Eel first laid
down that health care is a service vvithin the meaning of the Treaty." The
requirement for prior authorization was, in principle, found to be a barrier to
free movement. The immediate impact of the ]998 judgments was, however,
modest in that they considered only 1101J-JlOspitaf core (e.g. a pair of spectacles
and dental treatment). and concerned the reimbursement-based Luxembourg
health care system.
In subsequent rulings. the ECJ extended its interpretation across the fuJI range
of EU health care systems, including to national health systems such as the
Nordic ones. The Geracts-Slllits and PeeriJoollls judgments of 200 17 repeatecl- this
time with regard to the Dutch 'benefit in kind' health insurance system - that
prior authorization constitutes a barrier to the free movement of services. Such
a barrier could, howeyer, be justified provided that:
• the decision on whether or not to grant treatment abroad is based on 'inter-
national medical science', and
• an equivalent treatment can be provided in the competent member state
without 'unduE' delay' taking into consideration the medical condition of the
patient, broadly defmed.
The ECJ further laid restrictions upon national discretion to grant or not to
grant prior authorization by emphasizing that it can only be a justified barrier to
the principle of free movement if it is based on obiective, non-discriminatory
criteria known in advance, so national authorities cannot control the procedure
arbitrarily. Requests for authorization lllUSt furthermore be dealt with within
a reasonable time and refusals to grant authorization must be open to appeal
(para. 90. C-157/99l. In this vvay the ECJ initiates an emphasis on the citizens'
possibility of judicial redress.
The third step towards an internal health care market took place two years
later with the case of Miillcr-Fl1/1r(; al1d I'llll R.iet.~ In this case, the ECJ issued yet
another expansive. and controversiJl, interpretation by introducing a distinc-
tion between hospital and non-hospital care. In the case of hospital (are, the
court restated its view that the requirement for prior authorization is justified
on condition that it is exercised proportionately and that the national com-
petent institution has no scope for acting in an arbitrary Il1Jnner. The matter
was, however. quite different for 11011-lwspilal Cdrf'. The court laid down that
national authorization constitutes an unjustified barrier to the free lllove-
ment of services for non-hospital care. It did not further define non-hospital
care. Given the increasingly blurred distinction bet\\'een hospital and non-
hospital care, the future implications and confusion of this judgment are rather
extensive.
From the cases of Decker and Kohli onwards, it is clear that legal judgments
have made a significant contribution to the integration of health care, whereas
politics in the same period has been largely absent. Within a timespan of only
five vears, judicial activism laid down that EC law applies to a policy fidd which
was previously taken as an 'island beyond the reach of Community law,.Q
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(para. 79 of the judgment)
exceed the period which is acceptable on the basis of an objecti:,e
medical assessment of the clinical needs of the person concerned 10
the light of all of the factors characterizing his medical condition at .the
time when the request for authorization is made or renewed, as the case
may he
(para. 117 of the judgment)
In this "va\'. the l\"lltts case strengthens the position of the European patient.
-:\'ot onl\" I~as slhe been granted rights beyond the national borders, but s/~e has
also be~n proYided with a structure and judicial procedures through willch to
bvpass the national system or challenge its decisions. National system~ where
i~dicial routes to challenge administratiye decisions are weak are partICularly
exposed to challenge on this extension. .. . . I "
The last bastion for resisting the general appltcabllJty of the EC.J s pre\ 10 us
judgments has heen rejected hy this judgment, ~s the whole ra~ge of Europ~an
health care systems and seT\'ices must now he Il1terpreted agall1st the reqUlre-
men ts of EC law.
(para. 119 of the judgment)
This may pro\'e to be an important extension to the rights of the Europe~n.
patient since it sets redress limits to the time period and even went on to speCIfy
the ins~itutional structures that member states must provide to protect those
rights. The EC) repeated the concl:lsi~ns from the pr~~'io~~Sru~ings,.statin,g th~~
the requirement for prior authonzatlon cannot legltllnJze dlscre.tlO~a~~ deCI
sions bv national authorities but must be based on objecth"e. non-c\iscnmmatory
~riteria' and allow for decisions on authorization to be challenged in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings (paras. 115 and }16). But the cour~ go~s b:yond
a simple restatement of precedent and extends mem?~r states oblIgatiOn to
provide transparency and legal certainty to European CItlzens:
To that end, refusals to grant authorization, or the advice on \"'hi.ch such
refusals maY be based. must refer to the specific provisions on which they
are based ;nd be properly reasoned in accordance with them. Lik.ewise,
courts or tribunals hearing actions against such refusals must be able~ 1ft~e?
consider it necessary for the purpose of carrying out the reyiew whICh It l~
incumbent on the~l to make. to seek the advice of \....holly objective and
impartial independent experts
Furthermore, the decision as to whether the patient faces undue delay in acces-
sing sen'ices must he based on:
an objective medical assessment of the patient's medic~l cOIl.di.tion, the
history and probable course of his illness, the degree of pal.n he IS 1Il ~nd/or
the nature of his disability at the time when the request tor authOrIzation
\va:- made or renev\'ed
On May 2006, the EC.J's IVatts case was concluded. This was the first case to
specifically concern a national health system such as that in the United King-
dom, which provides health care as primarily a benefit in kind and tax financed;
similar systems exist in Ireland, the Nordic countries and the southern member
states.
The case concerned the topical waiting-time issue, in terms of a hip replace-
ment needed by Mrs Yvonne \-\'atts, a resident in the United Kingdom. ~frs Watts
request€d authorization to receive treatment abroad. That was refused by the
competent institution on the grounds that the examining consultant stated
that Mrs Watts was in no more need of a hip replacement than any of the other
patients on his waiting list. ~..frs Watts \vas told that she would have to wait
approximately one year for her operation. HO\'I'ever, upon reexamination, the
consultant recommended that she be operated on within three to four months,
as her situation had nm',' become worse. Despite this reduction in waiting time,
Mrs Watts went to France to have her hip replacement and, on her return,
requested reimbursement of her costs of £3900. The request was again rejected,
on the argument that the reduction in her v.;aiting time would have meant that
Mrs \Natts would have been treated \yithout 'undue delay'. :\Irs \Vatts took her
case to the Court of Appeal, which referred the case to the IC].
ln its judgment, the FC) confirmed, and indeed furthered. its previous line
of health-related judgments. One of the political implications of the case seems
to be that it further reduced the scope for national institutions to exercise
administrative discretion. Another implication is that it brings the rights
of the European patient into sharper focus - and thus strengthens the position
of the patient in hlture cases. In so doing, it interwnes in the national sphere of
governance.
Once again the ECJ stated that, regardless of the specific health care systems
and different individual features, all medical services are 'services' within the
meaning of the Treaty:
It should be noted in that regard that, according to settled (ase-Ia\\', medical
services provided for consideration fall within the scope of the provisions
on the freedom to provide services ... there being no need to distinguish
between care provided in a hospital environment and care pro\'ided outside
such an environment
14.3.1 Patient rights moving further into foal,<
(para. 86 of the judgment)
The court thus clarified that the characteristics of the United Kingdom T\ational
Health Service do not exempt it from EC law. The internal market principles
apply regardless of the way the national system is organized (para. 90 of the
judgment).
It is important, hmvever, that the EC) did not specify in terms of time period
when a waiting time for a particular treatment can be considered to be 'undue
delay' or beyond 'the time normally necessary'. But it did set out a criterion for
determining whether a period of waiting time is acceptable in the context of
EC law and further specified that national decisions must be reviewable. The
waiting time must not:
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14.3.2 Commission initiatille and the responses of
member states
Onc first Commi~sion initiath'e to politically codify the rulings of the ECJ was
through the proposal for a Directh'e on scrviccs in the internal market.HI The
proposal precisely replicated ICJs decisions in its article 23, proposing (1) an
internal market for non-hospital carc, where the patient has a right to seek
treatment in another member state \-\'ilhout prior authorization and sub-
sequently have the costs reimbursed by the competcnt national institution; (2)
a right to hospitalization in anoth,er member state, pro\'ided that the member
slate of affiliation offers the same treatment, and that authorization has been
granted beforehand. The health ministers turne<.1 the proposal down, refusing
to have their policy area regulated as part of a general directive on services,
placed under the responsibility of the Directorate General (DG) 011 internal
market.
Hereafter, it appeared clear thaI European health care could not be regulated
solely from an overall internal market perspective, but still the judicial integra-
tion needed political codification and more transparency. On September Z006,
DG Health (SANCO) communicated a consultation procedure on health ser-
vices.ll The communication called for stakeholders to state their opinions
on a set of questions related to the free mO\Tment of health sef\'ices. Almost
300 contributions wcre submitted up to 31 January Z007, and a large set of
stakeholders took part. Among the contributors \H're member states and
European Economic Area states, regional authorities, national parliaments,
national organizations. international organizations, citizens, uni\'('rsities, COIll-
mercial organizations and companies.
Initially, the Commission was suppos<,'d to adopt its proposal for a Directive
all 'patient rights in cross-border health care' in late 2007, but the adoplion of
the proposal was postponed to 2008 (EUu/Jscn'er, 19 December 2007). Appar-
ently, the run-up to the presentation of the proposal contained contlicts and
disagreements. The main political fault lines seem to ha\'e been internal dis-
agreements in the College of Commissioners and ~relllbers of the European
Parliament acting as veto-players.
Regarding the Commission, there appears to haye been considerable dis-
agreements hetv\'een the commissioners behind the scene. Some commissioners
expressed concerns about the impact of the directh'e on national health care
systems, others pointing out the factor of timing and arguing that political
timing to present Ihe proposal \';as badly chosen in the shadow of the Lisbon
Treaty (EUobserwr, 7 February Z008). DG S.-\NCO, which had been in charge of
formulating the proposal. seems to haye been unable to unify the College of
Comnlissioners.
Within the European Parliament, members of the Party of European Socialists
(PES) voiced strong opposition, putting fom'ard arguments that the conse-
quences of the propo<.;a! could become considerable. dismantling national
abilities to plan health care capacities and exert budget control. The PES mem-
bers argued that the proposal compromised the control instrument of 'prior
authorization' also regarding hospital care, and hereby \\'en1 further than legal
integrative steps taken by the EC./:
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The Commission moves one step further than the decisions from the
European Court of Justice. It is highly problematic that prior authorization
is no longer required regarding the right to hospital treatment in another
member state. That depri\'e~ the memher states the instrument of economic
and capacity planning and implies a risk of financially draining the
national health care systems, because the patients in this \'I'ay can take
money along outside their own member state
(Christel Schaldemose (PES member of the European Parliament),
quoted in VnSt'11S ;'",fedicill, 1 February Z008; translated from Danish)
On Z lul\' Z008, the Commission was flllalh' successful in proposing the direct-
ive Ol~p~tient mobility.'~ The final directi\'~ proposal is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from the yersion set to be presented in December 2007. The amendments
to the December wrsion seem rather minor; however, the timing and the reac-
tions from the ~tembers of the European Parliament were quite different. This
time the presentation of the proposal \\'as not vetoed. Furthermore, the proposal
was presented as onc part of a much larger social package, which to somC'
extent diminishes the individual importance of the directive proposal. Currently
Uanuary Z009). the proposal is being negotiated in the Council and the
European Parliament - and a long-drawn negotiation process seems likely.
14.4 The Nordic health care systems in the European context
The impact of Europeanization on national health care systems depends, natur-
ally, on their specific organizational features. The Nordic health care systems
ha~'e several features that make theIll distinct in a European context. First, they
arc financed predominantly by different sources of taxation. This means that
they ha\'e public authorities as the 'third-party' financers of care rather than
independent sickness funds, as is common in continental European countries.
The publicly controlled financing of care also implies that access to care is open
to all ?\ordic citizens on equal terms, rather than regulated on the basis of indi-
vidual or occupation-based health insurance. The direct public control over
health care systems in the Nordic countries is extended also to the provision
side. In the c~se of primary care. provision is typically mixed, consisting of both
public health centres and privately practising GPs. In NOT\\'ay and Denmark, a
majority of primary care physicians are pri\'ately employed, whereas in Sweden
and Finland the opposite is true. In all :0Jordic countries, however, primary care
is publicly financed. The relatively high degree of public ownership and oper-
ation of health services provision can be said to be a typical :'Jordic featurc, even
if the same applics also to other tax-based systems. like the United Kingdom and
Ireland. In the case of secondary care, public provision dominates completrly,
as hospitals and other care institutions are normally owned and operated by
public authorities. The fact that health services are both financed and provided
by the same public body, typically a local government agency, means that the
Nordic svstems could be described as il1tesratcd.
Anoth-er distinct feature of Nordic health care is the crucial role of decentral-
ized political governance. The operation of the health care systems has typically
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been delegated from national authorities to local, self-governing bodies, at the
municipal, provincial or, more recently, regional level. In all but Norway (after
its regionalization reform of 2002), the local bodies responsible for health care
provisions are directly elected by the population, a feature which gives the
Nordic health care systems a democratic character in international comparison.
The relative independence of the municipal or provincial (or regional) health
authorities in the Nordic countries means that the organization of health care
provision can vary substantially from one location to another.
The exact implications of Europeanization for the Nordic health care systems
remairu; hard to pinpoint, as much 1,.still unknown about exactly what such a
process will entail. It is clear, however, that the Nordic systems are quite distinct
from the kind of insurance-based system, with independent sickness funds
acting in the role of payers, that the EC] seems to have had in mind in most of
its rulings in health care so far. This is noticeable, not least when the court dis-
cusses how caregivers should be reimbursed by sickness funds, and argues that
it should not matter so much for the financer whether the caregiver in question
is located in the same country or not, or when it talks about the value of free
competition and the creation of a non.discriminatory European 'market' also
for health services.
It can be argued that three different questions, at least, can be raised when it
comes to possible effects of Europeanization for the Nordic model of health
organization, each with distinct policy implications. The first concerns the role
of care providers and the need to develop further systems for their reimburse-
ment in the Nordic countries. If patients in all European countries are free to
move more across borders to seek care, there will be a need to standardize sys.
terns for billing and care financing and to determine the 'prices' for various
treatments. Such a development has more radical implications for caregivers in
the Nordic countries where, as noted above, resources have traditionally been
allocated through public budgets. In effect, an open market for health services
in Europe is likely to create an organizational logic where caregivers operate
more independently, both financially and administratively, also in the Nordic
countrics. Such a development has already been initiated in some countries
(particularly Sweden and Norway) through so-called purchaser-provider separ-
ation, but it is far from established everywhere.
The second question has to do with the status of patient rights in the Nordic
countries and possible implication of the ECj rulings and the proposal for a
Patient Rights Directive in this respect. Generally, formal patient rights in the
Nordic countries have tended to be quite weak, as health care has been provided
by public authorities as part of a more general public service, open to all, rather
than a service to which access is provided on basis of a specific insurance. The
public provision of care and absence of individual insurance has created less
need to legally specify obligations for insurers and health providers (Chapter 6).
This implies that the Nordic health care systems have, in some respects, had a
less 'legal' culture than some other systems in Europe, and that courts have not
had an important role within them. This may be changing, as several Nordic
countries, Denmark and Norway in particular, have recently sought to streng-
then patient rights by formal legislation. It seems obvious that this tendency
will be reinforced by a new Patient Rights Directive that stipulates - just as
..
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previous Eej rulings - that patients in all member states should be well
informed about their rights to seek care abroad and that, if prior authorization is
required to do so, they must have the right to legal appeal.
The third question raised by the ongoing Europeanization of the health care
sector concerns the implications for decision-making and governance within
this area in the Nordic countries. As noted above, health care in the Nordic
countries is largely governed by local/regional bodies, with a high degree of
independence. However, implementation of European rules, court rulings or
recommendations in this area calls for Iwtiollaf policy adjustments, which imply
that all actors within the system should adjust their working routines in a
similar way, including local and regional governments. This could rcsult in
an implicit streamlining of local policies and an enhanced role for national
governing bodies. Moreover, implementation of EUpolicy at the national level
is an often complicated process, where ncw EU initiatives need to be inter-
preted, their effects investigated and the relevant actors consulted before new
national regulation can be enacted or old amended. So for this reason too, EV
initiatives in the area of health may have the effect of centralizing policy-
making powers. It is also still predominantly as 'WtiollS that member countries
are represented within decision-making processes within the EV and can influ-
ence future policies in this area. Therefore, Europeanization in this area raises
questions about how the current division of policy-making authority in health-
care in the Nordic countries will be affected and how a possible shift towards a
more prominent role for national policy actors will affect central-local relations
in the Nordic health care systems.
14.5 The effects of European Union policies in single
Nordic countries
In this section, the Europeanization effects until 2008 are analysed, primarily
for the.Swedish and Danish health care organizations. The responses of Vinland
and Norway are touched upon briefly.
14.5.1 The Swedish system
Prior to the early 2000s, there was virtually no recognition in Sweden that EV
policies in the area of health had any direct bearing on national health policy.
Since then, this has changed and national authorities, particularly the Ministry
of Social Affairs (Socialdepartementet), now follow EV developments in this
area closely. A series of initiatives have been taken to adjust Swedish policies in
the health care sector to new EU regulations, particularly in the area of patient
mobility. The fact that these initiatives have been taken up by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and a national court reveals a dynamic whereby the national
governing bodies appear to have strengthened their powers within the heavily
decentralized system. This development has manifested itself also in the ten-
dency to propose legislation as a means to adjust domestic policies to European
precedents, which constitutes a break with previous modes of 'soft governance'
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and voluntary agreements between the central state and county counties as a
way to coordinate policies in the area of health care.
\Vhen they were handed down, the Kohli and Decker rulings received virtually
no attention in Sweden, and, if they did, their importance was played down. It
was generally believed that rulings did not concern an integrated health system
like the Swedish. In the early 2000s, treatment abroad was hardly a known
phenomenon in Sweden, and the country was aTllong the most reluctant in the
EU to authorize such requests. Palm and co-workers (2000) reported that about
20 requests a year for health care abroad were approved in Sweden, compared
with about 7000 in Luxembourg. .
Soon thereafter, however, Europea'n health policies started to receive more
recognition. In 2002, the Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs became part of
the so-called High-Level Reflection Process concerning health matters within
the EU. In the same year, the ministry appointed an expert group to investi-
gate the organization of highly specialized health care in the country, which,
like all hospital care in Sweden, is the responsibility of the county councils. In
its 2003 report, the group proposed that this part of the system should be subject
to special control on the part of the national government, and be led by a new
national board (Os 2003:56).13 According to the then l\'finister of Health, Lars
Engqvist (2004), a prime motive behind the proposal \vas the need for more
central coordination of the provision of highly specialized care in the country,
so as to be able to cooperate more effectively with other European member
states in this area.
In 2004, the fact that the EUdocs indeed have a direct impact on health care
provision in Sweden became obvious to all actors within this system. In January,
the Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden (Regeringsratten) delivered a
ruling based directly on previous ECJ rulings on patient mobility, in which it
overruled the refusal by a local Swedish authority to reimburse a patient for the
cost of medical treatment in Germany. The patient had appealed for authoriza-
tion according to the 1408/71 procedure but had been denied this on grounds
that the treatment in question was not given in Sweden as it was considered
medically dubious. The court noted that the Swedish health care system did not
have a satisfactory procedure for applying for health care abroad on the part of
individual patients and, technically, no legal demand to seek prior authoriza-
tion for care abroad, although there was a well-established administrative
procedure. The court also noted that the treatment given to the patient by the
German care provider was effective in curing her disease. As a result, the court
ordered the local health authority in question to reimburse the patient for the
full cost of the treatment (about 60,000 euro), thereby setting a legal precedent
that opened the possibility for Swedish patients to seek both primary and
secondary care abroad without prior authorization.
The ruling was first met with confusion among local health authorities, as it
was in opposition to the previously established procedure for receiving health
treatment abroad, which had been based on the 1408/71 system. The court not
only overthrew this procedure, it also went against the medical advice given in
the case in question, which had typically been of great importance in decisions
when patients demanded treatment abroad. In the year following the ruling,
applications for reimbursement for care abroad rose dramatically in Sweden,
1
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and an overwhelming majority (945 out of 110 I) were approved (Swedish Social
Insurance Agency 2006).
The Ministry of Social Affairs reacted swiftly to these developments by setting
up an investigatory expert committee to propose a new, formally regulated,
system for authorizing medical treatment abroad. In February 2006, the
committee delivered its report, in which it proposed a new law that would
regulate the processing of such applications. The content of the law was c10selv
tailored to the legal precedent set by the EC] and, therefore, made a distinctio;l
between hospital care, which would require prior authorization, and outpatient
care, which could be sought frecly abroad on the basis of the ECTreaty articles 49
and 50. The report also noted that authorization could not be denied by local
health authorities if the medical condition in question was treated within the
Swedish health care system but adequate and effective treatment could not
be given in the system within 'normal' time (Ministry of Social Affairs 2006).
The process of legally formalizing the proposal was later paused by the new
centre-of-right government that came into office ill 2006. When the patient
mobility directive proposal was presented by the European Commission in
2008, reactions from the S\vedish Government were generally positive. It noted
that new legislation will 'most likely' be necessary to adjust Swedish health care
policies to the contents of the directive in order to ensure that patient rights to
mobility are formalized and subject to judicial appea1. If such legislation \\'as
enacted, it would imply, in effect, that Swedish patients enjoy legal rights to
medical treatment abroad but lack corresponding rights to such treatments at
home, as these are not legally formalized at present (Vahlne 'VVesterhall2004).
vVhether Sweden will introduce a legal requirement for prior authorization in
order for patients to be reimbursed for hospital care abroad is still uncertain.
It can be argued that EU initiatives in the area of health have served to
highlight a weak spot of the Swedish system, namely swif1 access to care for
patients. This was acknowledged by the then Minister of Health in 2004, 'when
he stated that Sweden meets two of the common EU health policy goals
without any diffICulty, namely high quality and financial sustainability, but has
more problems with the third, access to care, and that this must be a priority
issue in Swedish health care in the future (Engqvist 2004). Access to health
services has been a controversial issue in Sweden for years because of the
occasional long waiting times for treatment. The legal precedent set by the EeJ
in the Watts case, which indicated that waiting time might indeed be a basis for
patients to be entitled to treatment abroad, could, therefore, be seen as a poten-
tial threat to the Swedish system, just as to that in the United Kingdom. This
problem was addressed in 2005, when the Ministry of Social Affairs negotiated
an agreement with the county councils that a national waiting-time guarantee
should be established within the system, ensuring that no patient in Sweden
should have to wait longer than a maximum of 90 days for treatment. The new
guarantee went into force in November 2005 and has led to renewed efforts by
the county councils to increase the supply of care and to be ready to purchase
additional services from other county councils or private caregivers should
the guarantee not be met. The recent ECJ ruling in t'\'atts, where the court
seemed to ask for a specified maximum waiting time but also held that four
months cannot be considered 'undue', indicates that the Swedish waiting-time
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guarantee would satisfy European demands for care delivered in reasonable time
and that waiting periods for up to three months would, in most cases, l~ not
constitute a basis for receiving care abroad. Therefore, even though the Swedish
waiting-time guarantee resulted primarily flom domestic political pressures, it
appears well in line with EU policies in this area. It seems, moreover, that the
implicit threat from the ECJ concerning the rights of patients to seek treatment
abroad if the waiting time at home was too long may have aided the Ministry in
persuading the reluctant county councils to agree to the waiting-time guarantee.
Given the adjustments ,••.ithin Swedish health care to meet new European
policies,in this area, as described abpve, a few final observations can be made
about the possible impact of the EU ~n the system. First, the open endorsement
of the ECj rulings on patient mobility by the Swedish Administrative Supreme
Court and Ministry of Social Affairs can be said to have strengthened the role of
judicial review and formal regulation within the Swedish health care system,
even though this runs against its previous tradition of more informal modes of
governance. If new legislation is enacted to implement the Commission's dir.
ective on patient mobility, this tendency will be further reinforced. It can also
be noted that the ECj rulings and the Patient Rights Directive have served
to highlight the fact that access to care has previously not been legally regulated
in Sweden.
A second observation is that the deepened European integration in the
health care area may have an important effect within the Swedish system if it
creates, as it seems that it does, legitimacy for an enhanced role for national
governing bodies in this area. The desire on part of the Swedish Government to
strengthen its control over the system and improve the coordination of local
health policies has been apparent in recent years and is reflected in a number of
political initiatives, such as the ,••.aiting-time guarantee, agreements with the
county councils concerning patient mobility within the country and proposals
to formalize patient rights. This indicates that the Europeanization of health -
care can have an important impact not only with respect to policy content but
also when it comes to the distribution of power and relations between local and
central actors in Swedish health care.
14.5.2 TheDanish system
The impact of the judicial interpretations of the principles of the internal
market on Danish health policy, while clearly visible, can be described as diffuse
and restrained.
The Danish Government was one of the first governments to react to the
Decker and Kohli rulings. Before the rulings, the Danish member state had
held the view that internal market rules had no impact on the health care
system whatsoever. The government, therefore, found it necessary to set up an
interministerial working group to analyse the implications of the judgments for
Danish health policy. The working group reported that these rulings contained
general premises that took the scope of the judgments beyond the lawsuits
themselves. Therefore, Denmark acknowledged that the cases had implications
for health care systems other than that of Luxembourg and were not limited to
•
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glasses and dental treatment. The Danish report, however, contained a narrow
definition of what constitutes a 'service' - and this national service definition
has been maintained since. To be a service according to the meaning of Treaty
Article SO, the Danish executive argued that there needs to be an element of
private pay involved:
It is the view of the working group that if, on the other hand, the treatment
had been taken care of by the p"1Jfic hospital sector, the Treaty's Article 49
would lJOt IUlve applied. The reason is that Article 50 defines services as
services nonllally earned Ollt ill rehlm {or remuneratiol1 ... Characteristic (or a
sen'ice is thlls t/fat a sen'ice provider offers a sen'ice itl retllm for renumeration.
(Danish Report on the Decker/Kohli rulings 1999, p. 23; emphasis added)
The Danish way of narrowing down the definition of 'service' could keep the
large majority of Danish health care services outside the definition, since they
are provided as benefits in kind, free of charge and therefore with no direct
remuneration.
However, in acknowledging that the principles of the internal market - under
certain conditions - apply equally to health care services, the interpretation of
the working group marked a decisive break with the then current Danish view.
The conclusions of the report resulted in a reform of Danish health policy as
from July 2000.IS This reform allowed general and specialist medical treatment
for persons insured under Group 2, as well as dental assistance, physiotherapy
and chiropractic treatments for all insured persons, to be purchased abroad with
subsequent fixed-price reimbursement from the relevant Danish institutions.
When the EC) wcnt further with its interpretations, Denmark decided to take
an active position and deliver opinion in the case of Geraels-Smits ami Peerbooms.
It is interesting to see that the conclusions of the Decker/KohlI report was used
as a platform for the Danish Government and largely replicated (Interview,
Danish Ministry of Health, 3 April 2001). The Danish Government stated that,
due to the absence of remuneration, hospital treatment did not constitute
a service within the meaning of Treaty Article SO (Report for the Hearing,
PI'. 76-77). Beyond making this point, Denmark argued that another precondi-
tion for a service to be Treaty-related was that it must be provided with a view to
making a profit (Report for the Hearing, p. 78).
The Court, however, overruled these observations and included in the under-
standing of 'remuneration' in Treaty Article SO indirect payments stich as those
transferred by social security funds to cover health care costs.
Through domestic policy reforms, Denmark introduced 'extended free
choice' from July 2002, meaning that patients received a right to treatment
outside contracted public hospitals in the event that these hospitals could not
provide the necessary treatment within two months. Since October 2007, the
waiting-time limit has been further reduced to one month. Denmark has hereby
defined what it finds to be 'undue delay' within the health sector. This reform
institutionalized the obligation to refer patients to non-contracted health care
providers in the event that care cannot be provided by the public sector within
the specifled waiting-time guarantee. However, in making it possible to opt for
treatment by non-contracted health care providers, the Danish reform had to
consider the EC principle of non-discrimination. The principle obliges member
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states not to favour a nationally established, non-contracted (i.e. private) pro-
vider over a provider in another member state. The Danish proposal for reform
directly referred to, and thus took account of the reasoning in the Smits and
PeerlJooms judgment (Legislative proposal 1.64, proposed 29 January ZOOZ;
adopted] 9 March Z002.). The ECj ruling thus impacted on Danish health care
by granting a different exit opportunity other than private supply (Le. health -
care supply outside the national border).
It is nevertheless notable that the patient has not been granted the right to
freely choose a foreign hospital \..,'henever 'undue delay' of a publicly provided
treatm~l1t occurs. The 'free choice'. is restricted to those private and foreign
hospitals with which the competent1)anish authority has entered an agreement
(Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet: 'Frit Valg af Sygehus'). The Association for
Danish Regions lists the private and foreign hospitals to which 'free choice' has
been extended and with which an agreement has been concluded (http://
www.sygehusvalg.dk!geoomraade.aspx). \Nhile 166 private hospitals or clinics
in Denmark were listed in April 2007, only seven foreign hospitals orclinics were
included, of which three were hospitals in Germany, two in Sweden, one in
Spain and one is a German hospital established in Denmark. In practice, the
condition that an agreement has to be concluded beforehand means that
foreign hospitals are not treated on an equal footing with Danish private ones,
and free movement of services has not been institutionalized when contracted
hospitals in Denmark cannot provide treatment without undue delav. The cen~
tral argument for restricting treatment to contracted foreign prOviders only is
that this allows the Danish authorities to exercise control over the quality of
provision through prior assessment of overseas facilities. Assuring standards and
quality is still a national competence.
In several answers to parliamentary questions, the Danish Government
restated that its interpretation of the concept of 'service' within the meaning of
the Treaty is one that is carried out in return for remuneration and qualifies only
when the insured person pays more than half of the health care costsY' The
Danish Government thus maintained the definition of service that it formu-
lated in the wake of the Decker mui Kohli judgment and which exempted most
Danish health care services from the impact of the principles of the internal
market. As late as May Z006 the Danish Parliament was notified bv the executive
that this was the governing interpretation. '
Meanwhile the official definition of health care sen'ices remained restrictive;
its correctness was discussed internally in the Danish Ministry of Health. Behind
the official executive stage, discussions started in the \\'ake of the Miiller Faure
and vml Riel ruling - possibly earlier. Access gained to internal docurnentsl7
shows that civil servants in the Ministry of Health raised doubt that the Danish
definition was in line with the European concept of services as early as June
Z003 and notified the minister thereof in an internal note. Later, in March 2004,
another internal note hlrther examined whether the Danish reinterpretation
was in line with the ECj interpretation of the concept - and explicitly stated that
it was not.
Nevertheless, the official policy remained restrictive, based on the original
definition. During the same period, citizens increasingly raised the question
about exactly which health care treatments they were entitled to access without
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a prior authorization from the Danish authorities. One such question .can:e
from a Danish pensioner who had received outpatient treatment at a hospital. In
Germanv.IS He subsequently requested his costs reimbursed by the Dalllsh
authorities, but the competent municipality refused on the grounds t~lat the
treatment had not been authorized beforehand. The pensioner complallled to
the Danish Social Appeals Board. In October Z003, the National Social Al~pe.als
Board turned down the complaint, reasoning its decision on the restrIctive
Danish definition, consolidated by law in 2000. In the refusal, the def1l1itiOI~, as
quoted above, was explicitly referred to. Only health ca.re for .w~ich the patJ~nt
paid more than SO per cent of the costs qualified as serVICes WIthin the meaning
of the Treat\'.
The case did not end here. The pensioner went to the Danish Ombudsman,
who began to examine the case and requested the Social Appeals Board to
further qualify its decision, taking the ECj decisions further into account. An
exchange of questions and answers between the Ombudsman, the National
Social Appeals Board and the Ministry subsequently took place. As a result ?f
this dialogue, addressing national interpretations and the r~le of law as ~ald
down bv the ECj, the Social Appeals Board in March 2005 deCided to reconSider
the cas~. The reexamination of the case took about 1.5 year - and in September
2006 the Board came out with its second decision on the case.I'l It stated that the
European Court seemed to interpret the concept of service in ~ broader way
than the one stated bv Danish law. However, although the outpatient treatment
did fall within the e;tended understanding of a health care service, the Board
still found that the pensioner was not entitled to have his costs reimbursed,
given that he had not been referred to the treatment by a GP as the Danish
law requires. .
Over a year later the Danish Minister of Health came out With a law proposal,
admitting to the nev.,' understanding of health care service. In the meantim~,
the Danish Ombudsman reminded the Ministry that the Social Appeals Board IS
the highest authoritative level for interpreting such uncertainty.2o The I~\\I"was
amended on 1 December Z008.21 As a result, specialist treatments outSide the
hospital sector can now be accessed in another EU state and the costs ~re to be
reimbursed bv Danish health insurance, irrespective of whether the patient pays
a part of the "treatment or not. The law amendment ~oes ~10t, howev~r, mean
that the whole spectrum of outpatient care can be received III another EU memo
ber state, only those sets of treatments where an agreement has been established
between the health insurance and the specialist doctors in Denmark.
Meanwhile Denmark has taken another step towards implementing the EC]
decisions, and Danish health care has been Europeanized a little further: the
Danish Government has initiated the negotiation process on the proposal for a
directive on patient rights. The Danish position is that clarification is needed,
and the government, therefore, declares itself positive tow~rds Europ~an
regulation, meaning clarification,. but it ha~ ~O~le re.ser~'atlons regard~ng
whether the proposal is in line With the subsldlanty pnncIple. ForthcoIlling
negotiations will indicate how the more specific Danish position turns out, and
how a compromise wiII be established.
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14.5.3 Finnish and Norwegian responses
J:inland responded to the Decker and Kohli rulings by new guidelines given by
the Social Insurance Institution, opening up patient mobility based on Article 49
of the Treaty. An amendment of the Health Insurance Act, which entered into
force March 200S, legislated that an insured person can have costs refunded
when treatment is given in another member state- but under a set of conditions.
Although this allowed for some patient mobility, Finland has received a
reasoned opinion from the Commission finding that Finland, in practice,
restrict~.pal'ient mobility by setting up a set of conditions for receiving treatment
abroad (Sakslin 2006). '
Norway is a member of the European Economic Area and has also delivered a
contribution to the Commission's open consultation procedure. Norway noted
that patient mobility to and from the Norwegian health system today is limited,
but it expects it to increase in the future. Norway l\'e1corned the Commission's
intensions to establish further legal clarity and transparency within the area. It,
however, appears to be more reluctant when it comes to how to ensure an
accessible health sector for the national population, writing that it 'is a chal-
lenge to make sure that developments in the area of patient mobility and health
services do not lead to greater social inequality with respect to accessibility to
health services. A Commission proposal must make sure to prevent a situation
where only the most resourcehil patients are able to enjoy rights relating to
patient mobility.' Norway furthermore finds that it should be justifiable to give
higher priority to patients from the home social security system than from other
member states - in order to ensure that treatment can be provided efficiently.
This is a position it shares foremost with the newer member states and the
United Kingdom, but a position which clearly goes against the fundamental
principle of equal treatment within Community law.
14.6 Concluding remarks
The institutionalization of EU rules on patient mobility has been considerably
furthered by European legalism since the mid-1990s. Although there are many
factors making the integration process difficult, the impacts and challenges
on health care policies in member states are increasingly identifiable. This is
also true for the Nordic health care system, although its characteristics as tax
financed, publicly controlled and organized, and with a decentralized structure,
at first sight appear to shelter it from the market.correlating impacts of
the internal market. The exact effects are still difficult to pinpoint and will
become clearer with further time and developments. But the outline is there.
It seems safe to conclude that the EUwill come to playa more prominent role
as regulator and knowledge centre in the health care sector in the future, a
development that implies a movement - albeit slow - towards increased policy
coordination and some kind of system convergence.
The analytical comparison between Sweden and Denmark demonstrates
that health care integration does not impact in a similar way. Instead impact,
as it has unfolded in the two Nordic countries so far, depends on the
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national administrative, political and legal responses to the supranational
events.
Nevertheless, we argue that at least three converging responses and future
unavoidable challenges are identifiable. First, one natural consequence will be a
need to standardize systems for billing and care financing for European patients
and to determine the 'prices' for various treatments. Public health care budgets
will have to be made market transparent. Second, European legalism implies
an increased focus on patient rights. This goes against the Nordic tradition, in
which formal patient rights have tended to be relatively weak as health care has
been provided by public authorities as part of a more general public service,
open to all, rather than a service to which access is provided on the basis of a
specific insurance and hence a set of specific rights. Rights will become more
individualized and individually enforceable. This may further cause the Nordic
state-society relation to turn more 'legal', opening up more health-related court
cases and more prominent roles for courts. On this aspect, it is interesting to see
how the Swedish court case paved the way for further reimbursement demands
for the costs of treatment in other member states. Third, regions and local
authorities within the health sector are not policy-makers in the integration
process as it has unfolded so far. Therefore, Europeanization seems to be
tantamount to centralization. There will be an increased need to balance the
interplay between the different levels of health care governance. Governing
authority has taken an unexpectedly centralized turn in Sweden. In Denmark,
the regions note that, as supranational competence expands into their
traditional sphere of control, they will need to demand new decision-making
competences similar to those of the German Landers in order to maintain their
traditional domain of governance. This suggests that the Europeanization of
health care could have a significant impact not only for health policy content
but also for the distribution of power and relations between local, regional and
central actors in Nordic health care.
Much of the future scope and direction of Europeanized health care will
depend on which collective political steps will be taken as the Commission's
recent proposal is negotiated and compromises are established. It will also
depend on the specific wording of the final legislative text. It is far from certain
that member governments will manage to establish a coherent political agree-
ment. If this is the outcome of the current attempt at policy formulation, the
ECj will continue to be the motor of integration in the field of health care. Then
the scope and direction of future developments will continue to bypass the
political level and be decided by the interplay between citizens claiming their
rights, private interests seeking markets, national courts interpreting European
legalism and the ECj as authoritative decision-maker.
Notes
1. In the preparation of this chapter, the authors found very little published informa-
tion on the impacts of EUintegration on the health care systems of Norwayand
Finland.
2. COM(2001)723, 5 December2001.Communication from the Commissionon ,he
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Future of Health Care and Care for the Elderly: Guaranteeing Accessibility, Quality
and Financial Viability, p. 13.
3. COM (2004) 204 final, 20 April 2004. Communication from the Commission on
Modernizing Social Protection for the Development of High-Quality, Accessible and
Sustainable Healthcare and Long-term Care. Support for the national strategies using
the open method of coordination.
4. A new regulation, 883/2004, was adopted on 29 April 2004 but does not enter into
force before the implementation regulation is adopted by the Council. The proposal
on the implementing regulation ••..••as adopted by the Commission on 31 January
2006, COM (2006) 16, and is currently negotiated in the Council Working Group on
Soctal Affairs.
S. For a more detailed description of the series of judgments, see Martinsen (2005).
6. In the cases C-120/95, Decker, 28 April 1998 and C-158/96, Kohli, 28 April 1998.
7. Case C-157/99, Geraets-Srnitsand PeC'r/moms,12July 2001.
8. Case C-385/99, 13 May 2003. Miilfer-Faure v 01ldrrlillge lVaarborgmaatsc1rappij OZ
Zorgl'C'rzekeringenand Vall Riet l' O"derlinge H'aarborgmaatsc1lappij ZAO Zorgl'l!flekerill-
gm. ECR2003, p. 1-04509.
9. As formulated by the Advocate General Tesauro in the 1998 cases of Decker and KolIlI,
which will be further examined below
10. COM (2004) 2, 5 March 2004. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Services in the Internal Market.
11. The Communication is SEC (2006) 1195/4, 26 September 2006.
12. COM (2008) 414. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Application of Patients' Rights in Cross-border Healthcare.
13. The recommendations were later turned into a legal proposal (Ministry of Social
Affairs 2005) but have not yet been enacted.
14. This depends, as stated by the court and later in the Commission's directive,
on the nature of the disease and the degree of medical urgency in receiving
treatment.
IS. 111epolicy reform entered into force by law no. 467 of 31 May 2000 and BEKno. 536
of IS June 2000.
16. Answer to Parliamentary question no. 89, 28 June 2005; answers to parliamentary
questions no. 4965, 4967 and 4969, 17May 2006)
] 7. The present analysis in part builds on achieved access to internal documents, cover-
ing documents from the Ministry of Health, the National Social Appeals Board and
the Danish Ombudsman.
18. This part of the analysis also builds on the achieved access to internal documents.
19. Decision S-2-06.
20. Letter from the Danish Ombudsman to the Ministry of Health, May 2007.
21. As of BEKno. 1098 and Vej. No. 70 of 19th November 2008.
References
Alter, K. (1998) Who are the 'Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the
European Court of Justice, Intemaliollal Organization 52: 121-47.
Alter, K. (2000) The European Union's legal system and domestic policy: spillover or
backlash? IlltC'nmtiOllaf Organization 54: 489-518.
Blomqvist, P.(ed.) (2004) Dell griitlSfiisa viif{iirdsstatf71. Stockholm: Agora.
Borras, S. and ]acobsson, K. (2004) The open method of co-ordination and the new
governance patterns in the EU,European/olimal of Public Policy II: 185-208.
Engqvist, L. (2004) Mer statJigt styre i vArden.Dasens Nyhetrr, 11May.
The European Union: single market pressures 315
Erhag, T. (2004) EU-lagstiftningens pAverkan pA svensk socialfOrsakringsratt, in
Blomqvist, P.(ed.) Dc" granslosa l'iilrdrdsstaten. Stockholm: Agora.
Ferrera, M. (2005) TIre Boundaries of Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garrett, G. (1995) The politics of legal integration. Intenratiollal Organisation 49: 171-81.
Garrett, G., Kelemen, D. and Schultz, H. (1998) The European Court of Justice, national
governments, and legal integration in the European Union, Intenratiollal Organization
52,149-76.
Geer, S. (2006) Uninvited europeanization: neocfunctionalism and the EU in health
policy, /ollmal of Etlropeall Public Policy 13: 134-52.
Goldstein, J., Kahler, M., Keohane, R. and Slaughter, A.-M. (1998) Introduction: Legaliza-
tion and world politics, ll1lenrational Orgmlization 54: 385-99.
Liebfried, S. and Pierson, P.(2000) Social Policy. Left to courts and markets? In Wallace, H.
and Wallace, W. (cds) Policy-making in tile Ellropean Union, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Martinsen, D.S. (2005) Towards an internal health market with the European Court, West
European Potitics 28: 1035-56.
Mattli, W. and Slaughter, A.-M. (1998) Revisiting the European Court of Justice,
llltenratiollal Organization 52: 177-209.
Ministry of Social Affairs (2005) I)ropositiofl (Legal proposal) 2005/06: 73. Nationell samordll-
illg av rikssjllkl'arden. Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs.
Ministry of Social Affairs (2006) Ds 2006:4. Ratten till ersattning fOrkostruuler fOr l'llrd iannal
EES-Iand_ Ell overs"lI. Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs.
Mossialos, E. and McKee, M. (eds) (2002) EU Law and the Social C/raracter of Healtll CtlTe.
Brussels: P.I.E.Peter Lang.
Obinger, H., Liebfred, S. and Castles, F. (2005) Bypasses to a social Europe? Lessons from
federal experience, /ollnral ofEllropemr Pliblic Polir" 23: 545-71.
Palm, W., Nicless, N., Lewalle, H. and Coheur, C. (2000) ImpticatiOlrs of Recent /urisplldl?lce
011 lile Co-ordinatioll of Healtlr Care Protection S".Hems. (Report produced for the
European Commission Directorates - General for Employment and Social Affairs.]
Brussels: Association Internatlonale de la Mutualite (AIM).
Pierson, P. (ed.) (2001) 11leNew Politics of t1re Welfare Slate. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Undrrstmrdi"g Govenrmrce: Policy Networks, Govemance, Re[1exh'ity
and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Sakslin, M. (2006) Training and Reporting 011 Europeall Social Security. Finland: National
Report.Ghent: Ghent University Project for the EUCommission DG Employment and
Social Affairs.
Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Fbrsakringskassan] (2006) Silltmpport. Kartliiggnill:~
av grallso\'erskridande plallC'fCld vdr inom EU/EES (inatlsierarl ai' Fjjr.~akrin:orskassmr
2004-2005. Stockholm: Forsakringskassan.
Vahlne Westerhal1, L. (2004) EUoch den svenska sjukvArden: om patienters rattighetcr, in
Blomqvist, P.(cd.) Dl'Il gramfosa \'iif{iirdsstatell. Stockholm: Agora.
